Matthew Frise, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
- Milwaukee WI UNITED STATES
- Humanities, Social Science and Communication
Matthew Frise's scholarly work focuses on memory as it pops up in epistemology, cognitive psychology, and the philosophy of mind.
Multimedia
Education, Licensure and Certification
Ph.D.
Philosophy
University of Rochester
2015
M.A.
Philosophy
University of California, Santa Cruz
2010
B.A.
Philosophy
San José State University
2007
Biography
Frise was a lecturer at Santa Clara University, a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Baylor University and a Dissertation Fellow at Saint Louis University. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Rochester in May 2015.
Frise's research has been published in such journals as Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies, The Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, American Philosophical Quarterly, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, and Erkenntnis.
Areas of Expertise
Affiliations
- Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes : Associate Member
- Epistemology of Memory : Area Editor
Social
Event and Speaking Appearances
Justification on the Tip of the Tongue
Issues in Philosophy of Memory 3 Duke University
You Don't Know What Happened
Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Online Conference Online
Justification on the Tip of the Tongue
Graduate Epistemology Conference University of Rochester
Justification on the Tip of the Tongue
Southeastern Epistemology Conference University of Florida
Forgiving without Remembering
Southeastern Epistemology Conference University of Florida
Selected Publications
You don't know what happened
Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory2022
Chapter 12 argues that episodic memory does not usually give us knowledge of the past.
Forgetting memory skepticism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research2020
Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory’s epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification.
Reliabilism’s Memory Loss
The Philosophical Quarterly2020
Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it.
Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past
The Philosophical Quarterly2017
Episodic remembering returns us to events in our personal past. This crisp and impressive book addresses three main questions about it: What exactly is it? How does it enable human knowledge? Why did we evolve to have it?
Upping the Ex Ante Problem for Reliabilism
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly2019
Process reliabilism is a theory about ex post justification, the justification of a doxastic attitude one has, such as belief. It says roughly that a justified belief is a belief formed by a reliable process.
